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A growing body of empirical evidence fails to support rational choice expectations of su-
perior private sector efficiency in the urban water sector. Drawing on Oliver Williamson’s
work on comparative institutional analysis, I suggest that institutional adaptability explains
the efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector relative to the private sector. Under pri-
vate sector participation, lowly remediable institutional adaptability favours the deployment
of asymmetric power and the production of outcomes unaligned to reform objectives. Con-
versely, institutions supporting public operations are designed to facilitate the achievement of
collective goals. This makes the alignment of individual attitudes, resources and institutions
under in-house service provision less resilient to sustainability-oriented change. Remediable
institutional alignment undergirds the comparative advantage of public water operations, as
more ample opportunities are provided for compliance, allocative efficiency and adaptive per-
formance. I thus call for a critical realist account of the outcomes of water service reform, free
of rational choice dogma.
Keywords: Rational choice, institutional alignment, institutional adaptability, remediable-
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1. Introduction
Urban water supply and sanitation are as essential a service as they are controver-
sial to organise and manage. These public services satisfy basic human needs and pre-
vent public health hazards (Heller, 2009), are central to fostering economic development
and social cohesion (UNESCO-WWAP, 2006; Gandy, 2004), and produce cross-cultural
meanings associated with life and death, and with social and spiritual identity (Strang,
2005). Their economics, organisation and governance are determined by their typical
natural monopoly market structure resulting from the dominant technological paradigm
(Lobina & Hall, 2010). Rational choice theories such as public choice, property rights,
and transaction cost economics, have dominated scholarly discourse and informed pol-
icy in the last few decades (Peters, 2005; Self, 1993). These strands of thought agree
that the ownership of service providers matters (Dietrich, 1994) and have inspired the
Washington and Post-Washington Consensus insistence on private sector participation
c© Baltzer Science Publishers
110 E. Lobina / Remediable institutional alignment and water service reform: Beyond rational choice
(PSP) – a set of reforms ranging from outright divestiture to the transfer of management
rights to the private sector via concessions, operating contracts and other forms of del-
egation – and marketisation as the preferred approach to water service reform (Bayliss,
2006, 2001). This insistence is predicated upon theoretical expectations of superior pri-
vate sector efficiency in the provision of water supply and sanitation. As a result, since
the 1980s there has been a significant increase in PSP through developed, transition and
developing countries (Hall & Lobina, 2009). While the results of a growing body of
literature question claims of superior private sector efficiency (Lobina & Hall, 2009),
the intellectual hegemony of rational choice remains unchallenged (Crouch, 2007; Fine,
2009).
The purpose of this article is to contribute to the theoretical debate on water ser-
vice reform. It does so by evaluating the cogency of rational choice theories and iden-
tifying the theoretical gaps these have left in the explanation of the behaviour of public
and private water operators. A microanalytic approach (Williamson, 1999) is adopted to
explicate the merits of alternative organisational forms for the provision of water sup-
ply and sanitation services. More precisely, I compare public and private operations at
the lowest operational level, and consider the alignment of the respective organisational
goals and structural attributes to achieve the objectives of service delivery. This article
is not concerned with a macroanalytic approach to the emergence of public and private
organisational forms for the operation of water services and the path dependency of alter-
native institutional trajectories (Granovetter, 1985). This complementary perspective is
addressed, among others, by Castro (2009) who looks at the systemic conditions of wa-
ter service reform in developing countries, and by Swyngedouw’s (2009) analysis of the
retooled Washington Consensus as the institutional landscape of water service reform.
The next section introduces the notion of water service governance – of which wa-
ter service reform is part and parcel – and develops an analytical framework based on the
policy networks metaphor. I use this framework to illustrate the limitations of rational
choice theories in investigating the duality of agency and institutions in the water sector.
The same framework is also functional to trace a research agenda for water service re-
form. The third section reviews the positive and normative dimensions of rational choice
theories, in view of the influence these perspectives exerted on the policy of interna-
tional development agencies and governments in the last thirty years. Section four draws
on empirical evidence questioning the validity of rational choice theories. An increas-
ingly extensive body of quantitative evidence refutes theoretical expectations of greater
private sector efficiency and effectiveness. Qualitative data is then used to explain why
such expectations fail to materialise and why public water operations offer greater po-
tential to enhance sustainability. In section five, I reflect on the significance of findings
by focusing on the alignment of agency, power and institutions with sustainability objec-
tives, respectively under private and public water operations. The final section calls for
a theory of water service reform free of rational choice dogmas, and outlines a research
agenda towards that aim.
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2. Analytical framework: Water service governance and policy networks
Green (2007) identifies three dimensions of water governance: a) the process and
outcome of institutional reform; b) the role played in this process by public, private and
social actors; and, c) the economic, but also political, social and environmental implica-
tions of the first two dimensions. Green’s (2007) definition treats water governance as a
process of multi-actor, networked interaction in the pursuit of a collective goal and is thus
consistent with Swyngedouw’s (2005) notion of networked governance as government-
beyond-the-state. Klijn and Koppenjan (2006: 144) define networks as “patterns of so-
cial relationships between mutually dependent actors”. These relationships are formed
around policy problems or policy programmes (Klijn, 1997). Policy networks are used
heuristically to investigate political phenomena (Christopoulos, 2008) and water reform.
More precisely, Lobina & Hall (2007a) use policy networks as an analytical framework
to shed light on the dynamic interest-seeking of private water operators and test the co-
gency of public choice and property rights theory. A similar approach is adopted by
Lobina (2005a) and for the purposes of this article.
Building on Lobina & Hall (2007a), I offer the following description of the pol-
icy networks metaphor. Actors in a policy network strategically interact in response to
their attitudes, and such interaction is informed by the respective power and the insti-
tutional context shaping their relationships. Attitudes guide agency and derive from the
actors’ own beliefs, interests and calculation – what actors believe is right, what objec-
tives they want to achieve, and what costs and benefits they estimate are implied with
the pursuit and achievement of their objectives (Axelrod & Lehman, 1993). External in-
centive structures consisting of expected positive and negative sanctions are thus one of
the determinants of attitude formation and intensity. Power can be defined as the ability
to induce and resist change and does not necessarily coincide with authority. The avail-
ability of tangible and intangible resources – including status, legitimacy, knowledge
and money – is central to power. Power produces resource-based dependence between
actors (Giddens, 1979; Green & Anton, 2010). Therefore, power cannot be confined to
the outcome of mere resource allocation (Dietrich, 1994) and can be rather seen as the
result of resource mobilisation in a relational context. For example, one actor’s power
can be given by the perception other actors have of his or her power (Klijn, Koppenjan,
& Termeer, 1995). Relations are characterised by the principles of mutuality, conflict
and order. When mutuality prevails, actors exchange resources for the achievement of
their goals. If these are communal objectives, transactional relationships are also cooper-
ative. In case of conflict, resources are deployed for the attainment of opposite goals. In
principal-agent relationships within organisations or social systems, hierarchy presup-
poses the exercise of authority over subordinates (Williamson, 1999).
Institutions constitute the structure which supports agency and are “implicated in
the reproduction of social systems” (Giddens, 1979: 64, 81–82). It is possible to distin-
guish between different conceptions of the relation between organisations and institu-
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tions. Williamson (1975, 1985) views organisations as institutions whose governance is
aimed at minimising the transaction costs associated with economic activity. According
to this conception, organisational modes for the delivery of water services are institu-
tions. Sociologists tend to emphasise instead the connectedness between organisational
structure and operation on one hand, and between organisations and societal processes
on the other. Institutions can be seen as composed of three separate but interconnected
elements. The regulative pillar consists of the formal and informal rules constraining and
regularising behaviour that are governed by the logic of instrumentality, as agents adapt
their actions to maximise their utility in consideration of expected positive or negative
sanctions. The normative pillar consists of the values that encapsulate shared conceptions
of the desirable, and of the norms that prescribe societal goals and define the legitimate
means to achieve them. In this case, the logic underlying agency is that of appropriate-
ness: actors’ adherence to the normative aspect of institutions reflects their acceptation
that the prescribed behaviour is correct. The cognitive-cultural pillar includes the com-
munal understanding of reality and views of the world. Compliance with the cognitive-
cultural component of institutions occurs as other courses of action are inconceivable and
existing routines are taken for granted. The dominant logic here is that of orthodoxy. The
three illustrated pillars of institutions are mutually reinforcing, which explains why insti-
tutions are relatively resistant to change, tend to be maintained and reproduced through
generations, and are a stable feature of social life (Scott, 2005).
In summary, I assume that different actors carry different combinations of inter-
ests and attitudes, which define the intensity of incentives to accomplish their objectives.
Agency is also determined by actors’ ability to use resources and respond to institutional
demands. Interaction between actors or coalitions of actors within a policy network is
thus the result of interaction between different sets of incentives, resources and abilities
to use underlying institutions to realise aims. This interaction represents a mechanism
through which the distribution of power within a network is reproduced and altered. Fi-
nally, sustainability is a normative objective of water governance. The governance and
operation of water services should be directed towards sustainability if “good gover-
nance” is to be achieved (Rogers & Hall, 2003). Water service sustainability is seen
as the sustained reproduction of political, economic, social, technical and environmen-
tal (PESTE) regimes and their interdependent cycles (ERL-UCM and PSIRU, 2003).
The application of normative coherence in the operationalisation of water service sus-
tainability demands that efficiency be instrumental to the achievement of effectiveness
(Idelovitch & Ringskog, 1995). In fact, the ultimate objective of water service provision
is the satisfaction of the developmental needs of the beneficiary communities, not the
needs of the operational process.
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3. A review of rational choice theories of the firm
Rational choice consists in the common assumptions informing a variety of the-
ories of the firm. These assumptions are that individuals are rational, are intrinsically
self-interested, and take actions aimed at maximising their own utility (Peters, 2005;
Self, 1993; Dietrich, 1994). Although these theories share assumptions, methods and ex-
planations, I distinguish between public choice and property rights theory on one hand,
and Williamson’s approach to transaction cost economics on the other. The former the-
oretical perspectives predict government failure in the provision of water services and
recommend the introduction of PSP. The latter has a less pronounced normative charac-
ter in relation to the ownership of service providers.
3.1. Public choice and property rights theory
Public choice theory contends that public service provision is intrinsically inef-
ficient due to the self-interested behaviour of public managers who prioritise budget
maximisation over the public interest (Renzetti & Dupont, 2003). This negative view of
the public sector stems from four premises derived from principal-agent analysis. First,
individual voters cannot control the political process, nor keep politicians accountable
once they are elected. Second, interest groups manipulate the political process to their
advantage. Third, elected politicians cannot effectively control bureaucracies. Finally, in-
terest groups, politicians and bureaucrats mutually exchange favours to the detriment of
voters and consumers (Self, 1993). Conversely, public choice theory predicts that com-
petition enhances efficiency by reducing the excessive public supply of public services
(Bel, Fageda, & Warner, 2010; Bel & Warner, 2008). Contracting out water supply is
expected to improve performance as a result of competitive pressures (Boyne, 1998). It
is also argued that insulation from self-serving political interference results in the supe-
rior efficiency of regulated private enterprises over public undertakings. This insulation
arises from the fact that the institutional framework supporting privatisation guarantees
profitability in order to attract private investment (Willig, 1994).
Property rights theory expects the specification of property rights to induce efficient
resource allocation by influencing incentives and individual behaviour (Furubotn & Pe-
jovich, 1972; Dietrich, 1994). It posits that “private-sector owners, as residual claimants,
have more clearly defined incentives to push for efficient decision-making by managers”,
than elected officials, senior bureaucrats and taxpayers (Renzetti & Dupont, 2003: 10–
11). More precisely, the case for the superiority of private ownership rests on the “weak
incentives of government employees with respect to both cost reduction and quality in-
novation” (Shleifer, 1998: 138). The plurality of objectives pursued by public authorities
and public operators, which include social justice, also goes to the detriment of produc-
tive efficiency (Lorrain, 1997a). Premised on property rights, Demsetz (1968) argues
in favour of competition for the market to select public utility operators when competi-
tion in the market is unfeasible. Competition for the market takes the form of competitive
114 E. Lobina / Remediable institutional alignment and water service reform: Beyond rational choice
bidding for the long term right to serve a specified area. Regulation and contractual rene-
gotiation might be necessary to avoid excessive windfalls in cases whereby the durability
of investments requires entering long term contracts (Demsetz, 1968), as is typically the
case of urban water services. The so-called Demsetz competition is expected to promote
the efficiency of monopolists by sanctioning poor performance through the threat of
franchise termination, suspension, or non-renewal, and to mitigate the risk of regulatory
capture by minimising agency discretion (Baldwin & Cave, 1999).
World Bank literature stresses the role of property rights-induced incentives in fos-
tering the efficiency of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). Whether contractual options
ranging from management contracts to full concessions “perform better than full pro-
vision by state-owned enterprises depends in particular on whether performance risk is
effectively shifted from taxpayers to the private shareholders of the company that enters
into a concession-type arrangement” (World Bank, 2002b: 23–24; Brook Cowen, 1997).
Proponents of PSP also argue that due to the presence of natural monopoly, regulation
in the water sector should be accompanied by competition. Regulation and competition
would be mutually reinforcing as regulation is supposed to compensate for the limited
possibility to introduce competition, while competitive pressures would reduce the re-
quired regulatory burden (Rees, 1998; Franceys, 2000; Lorrain, 1997b).
3.2. Transaction cost economics
The Williamsonian tradition of transaction cost economics propounds that eco-
nomic activity should be organised so as to minimise individual’s bounded rationality
and to safeguard transactions from the threat of opportunism. The occurrence of op-
portunistic behaviour is less likely within a firm than under trading between two au-
tonomous parties, due to the propensity of hierarchy to impose its objectives over those
of individual agents. This tradition emphasises the importance of process on determining
outcome. This implies a preoccupation not only with the ex ante conditions preceding
a given transaction but also with how these conditions affect the ex post phase, for ex-
ample the execution of a contract. High asset specificity can cause a transaction to move
from a large-numbers exchange relation in the ex ante phase to a small-number trans-
action during contract execution. This situation is typical of the water sector and means
that both buyer and seller are locked into a bilateral monopoly (Williamson, 1988, 1981;
Dietrich, 1994).
Williamson (1999, 1997, 1988, 1981) argues that comparative institutional anal-
ysis is required to recognise the economic institutions conducive to economising on
transaction costs. According to the remediableness criterion, all feasible organisational
modes – market, hybrid, private bureau, public bureau – are flawed. Therefore, the trans-
action costs associated with the attributes of different modes during both the ex ante and
ex post phases have to be comparatively assessed in light of the nature of the transac-
tion to be performed. Among such attributes is the intensity of incentives to appropriate
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net gains, distinguished between high- and low-powered incentives (Williamson, 1999,
1988, 1981).
Demsetz’ (1968) assumption of efficiency being achieved through “unassisted”
competition for the market can be upset by incomplete information and uncertainty,
incomplete contracts, high asset specificity and opportunism (Williamson, 1976, 1981,
1988). Williamson (1976) identifies the following problems with Demsetz competition:
a) unclear award criteria; b) difficulties with auditing in case of divergence on price-cost
relations; c) defective incentives; d) weak credibility of contract termination as the sanc-
tion for poor performance; e) operators’ ability to renegotiate contractual terms to their
advantage; f) biased relationship between franchisor and franchisee, as political consid-
erations override economic considerations; g) lack of a level playing field during contract
renewal as the incumbent is favoured over other bidders. Furthermore, the possibility of
corruption and of price transfer through the vertically integrated units of the operators’
mother company is acknowledged.
The proponents of PSP in the water sector have left Williamson’s warnings un-
heeded. Drawing on Coase (1937), Lorrain (1997b, 1991) maintains that multinational
corporations enjoy a comparative advantage over municipal water operators as a result of
vertical and horizontal integration. Economies of scope mean that operating subsidiaries
would benefit from access to the group’s know-how on how to economise on the conduc-
tion of operations. Vertical integration across the production chain would allow private
groups to bypass the market for the purchase of ancillary goods and services and avoid
the associated transaction costs.
4. Empirical evidence on public and private operational performance
Studies that comparatively assess the operational performance of public and private
water operators fail to find evidence of superior private sector efficiency (Bel, Fageda,
& Warner, 2010; Bel & Warner, 2008; Hall & Lobina, 2009; Massarutto, 2007; Estache,
Perelman, & Trujillo, 2005). The reviewed quantitative evidence refers to: Argentinean,
Bolivian and Brazilian cities (Clarke, Kosec, & Wallsten, 2004); Brazil (Seroa da Motta
& Moreira, 2004; da Silva e Souza, Coelho de Faria, & Moreira, 2007); 76 African
enterprises (Kirkpatrick, Parker, & Zhang, 2006); Uganda (Mbuvi & Tarsim, 2011); 50
public and private operators in 29 Asian and Pacific countries (Estache & Rossi, 2002);
England and Wales (Saal & Parker, 2001; Saal, 2003; Saal, Parker, & Weyman-Jones,
2007; Florio, 2004); 5,000 French water operators (Chong et al., 2006); and 53 Spanish
cities (Martı´nez-Espin˜eira, Garcı´a-Valin˜as, & Gonza´lez-Go´mez, 2009).
Explanations provided in the quantitative literature for the absence of superior
private sector efficiency include: the limited competitiveness of the water sector (Bel,
Fageda, & Warner, 2010; Bel & Warner, 2008); the presence of substantial transaction
costs (Chong et al., 2006; Bel, Fageda, & Warner, 2010; Bel & Warner, 2008); and im-
proved public performance due to public sector innovation (Estache & Rossi, 2002; Bel,
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Fageda, & Warner, 2010; Bel & Warner, 2008). Even an extensive World Bank study
comparing the performance of more than 1,200 water and energy utilities in 71 develop-
ing and transition economies does not find conclusive evidence of superior private sector
efficiency. The observed operational efficiency gains under private operations are not ac-
companied by reduced prices and increased investments, suggesting that “the private
operator reaps all the gains through profits” (Gassner, Popov, & Pushak, 2009: 5).
In order to integrate such explanations, I look at empirical evidence derived from
qualitative studies on the behaviour of public and private actors in developed, transition
and developing countries, under different institutional and regulatory frameworks. The
“extensive observation” of more case studies and different organisational modes allows
for addressing issues of governance and power at microanalytic level (Williamson, 1976,
1999).
4.1. Problems with private water operations
The limited competitiveness of the water sector is not only explained in terms
of market structure. Private operators may use corruption to influence public decision
makers, circumvent competition and gain long term access to a captive market, obtain
favourable contractual terms or have their contracts extended at expiry. Evidence of cor-
ruption is found in developed and developing countries, and in relation to contracts that
are either competitively tendered or awarded after direct negotiation (Lobina & Hall,
2007a; Lobina & Paccagnan, 2005; Lobina, 2005a; Lobina & Hall, 2003; Hall & Lobina,
2004; Hall, 1999). Private operators might also engage in collusion to rig competition
in developed as well as developing countries (Lobina & Paccagnan, 2005; Hall, 1999;
Davis, 2004).
Private operators’ strategies and tactics determine relationships with public author-
ities during contract execution. Ranging from conflictive to collaborative, the nature of
these relationships depends on the stance adopted by contracting and regulatory author-
ities, and how this stance is compatible with the achievement of commercial objectives.
Private water operators rely on favourable resource allocation, asymmetric information
and expertise between regulated and regulator, to pursue profit maximisation (Lobina
& Hall, 2008a). Corresponding tactics include the manipulation of tariff formulas and
bills, overestimation of projected investments and demand forecasts, and price transfer
through integrated activities (Lobina, 2005a; Lobina & Hall, 2007a). Less than transpar-
ent accounts in Bandol-Savary, Nice and Avignon, France meant that private operators
charged consumers for investments that had not been realised (Cour des Comptes, 1997;
Global Water Report, 2002a,b).
Superior expertise in drafting and negotiating contracts may lead to private op-
erators averting performance risk (Lobina, 2005a). Superior expertise in renegotiating
contracts induces private operators to proactively exert pressure on contracting author-
ities. This aims at revising contractual terms in favour of the operator and relies on
the fact that contract law safeguards contractually agreed profit levels against change
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in circumstances. For private operators, this mechanism has the potential to turn an ad-
venturous bid into an economically advantageous deal. Renegotiation is thus systematic
and sought shortly after the award (Lobina, 2005a, 2006). Horizontally and vertically
integrated water multinationals may tactically use subcontracting to their own operat-
ing subsidiaries to renegotiate operating contracts. Subcontracted activities may include
technical assistance and managerial duties, infrastructure maintenance and construction.
Overpriced internal contracts result in losses for the operating subsidiary purchasing the
goods and services. As these losses are compensated for by adjusting prices upwards,
the final outcome is the appropriation of net gains by the mother company at the expense
of consumers (Lobina & Hall, 2007a, 2000; Lobina, 2005b,a).
Private operators entertain amicable relationships with complacent contracting au-
thorities and are ready to challenge regulatory acts undermining expected levels of prof-
itability. This pattern is replicated across developed, transition and developing countries.
Examples include the lack of conflict with the “sleeping” public partner in Cartagena de
las Indias, Colombia, and the conduction of contractual renegotiations between private
operator and central government, bypassing local regulators in Buenos Aires and Santa
Fe, Argentina (Lobina, 2005a). In England and Wales, the 1989 outright privatisation
of water and sewerage services was accompanied by the introduction of price-cap reg-
ulation enforced by the independent agency Ofwat. Despite its considerable resources,
Ofwat has been unable to deal with the companies’ opportunistic behaviour. From 1995
to 2006, so called “gaming” has resulted in over GBP 4.3 billion of extra dividends
paid to shareholders across the industry, equal to 9.6% of the total value of projected
investments. The deliberate misrepresentation of data has also been the object of inves-
tigations and charges brought by the Serious Fraud Office. The scandal emerged as a
result of whistle-blowing and not thanks to Ofwat’s regulatory scrutiny (Hall & Lobina,
2008; Lobina & Hall, 2008b). Factors explaining contracting and regulatory authorities’
lack of resolve to sanction poor performance include inability to access commercially
confidential data and poor regulatory capacity (Lobina, 2005a). Furthermore, contract-
ing authorities may justify the selected operator’s conduct to avoid admitting their error.
“Only in the event of egregious and persistent malperformance would an effort be made
to replace the winning franchisee” (Williamson, 1976: 81).
The tactics adopted by private operators in response to regulatory activities affect-
ing commercial returns range from litigation to the use of extra-legal pressure. The case
of Arezzo, Italy, is symptomatic. As the local regulatory agency questioned the efficiency
of the private operator, the latter responded by threatening multi-million compensation
claims and withholding payment of the concession fees due to municipalities. Local au-
thorities hence abandoned attempts to sanction the operator and agreed to renegotiate
the contract by increasing charges and postponing projected investments, to the conces-
sionaire’s advantage (Lobina, 2005b). Similarly, see Lobina (2005a) on the suspended
payment of concession fees in Manila, Philippines. Decision making on the termination
of controversial contracts has also been influenced by the menace of costly litigation
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in La Paz, Bolivia; Grenoble, France; and Szeged, Hungary (Lobina & Hall, 2007b,a;
Lobina, 2005a). In the course of a dispute with local authorities, the concessionaire sus-
pended operations of a wastewater treatment plant in Brussels, Belgium, causing signif-
icant environmental damage (Lamquin, 2010; Petrella et al., 2009; EPSU, 2010).
4.2. Reform of public water operations
Public water operators are wholly publicly owned and managed undertakings. They
can assume different organisational modes depending on their legal status, the degree
of managerial and financial autonomy, and the nature of governance and accountabil-
ity mechanisms. Public organisational modes vary from administrative departments to
publicly-owned PLCs (Public Limited Companies), with a number of hybrid forms in
between. Administrative departments are subject to public law and have no distinct le-
gal personality, and no managerial and financial autonomy. Publicly-owned PLCs are
governed by commercial law and enjoy a distinct legal status and full managerial and fi-
nancial autonomy from their public shareholders. Governance and accountability mech-
anisms range from bureaucratic to corporate models. In addition, public participation
can be introduced to integrate representative democracy and strengthen strategic deci-
sion making and regulation. In-house restructuring consists in the changes leading to the
passage of a public operator from one institutional and organisational mode to another,
while retaining full public ownership and control.
Public water operators in developed, transition and developing countries are ca-
pable of efficiency and effectiveness (Lobina & Hall, 2000, 2008a; da Costa et al.,
2006). Contrary to received wisdom (Baietti, Kingdom, & van Ginneken, 2006), non-
corporatised public operators can perform well. Evidence in this sense refers to admin-
istrative departments in France as implied in the findings of Chong et al. (2006). Moving
from a transaction cost economics perspective, they look at the decision of French local
authorities to opt for PSP or public water operations as a make-or-buy decision. Chong
et al. (2006) find in favour of the efficiency of public over private operators, pointing to
the efficiency of administrative departments as these constitute a large share of French
public water operators. A similar point can be made in relation to the literature assess-
ing the comparative efficiency and efficacy of public and private operators in developing
countries. Furthermore, in-house restructuring may result in improved operational per-
formance, as reform brings new rules, norms, values, cultural frames and incentives.
Several factors can induce the reform of public operations, only one of which is the
threat of privatisation to the existence of public operations (Estache & Rossi, 2002).
Other determinants of reform are: the willingness of decision makers to avoid the costs
– political, social, economic, environmental and technical – associated with PSP and
privatisation; decision makers’ views of the world; the content of applicable law; and,
pressure exerted by external actors.
The motivation of key actors in the reform of public water operations lies on vary-
ing combinations of self-interest, sense of appropriateness, and coercion. In Debrecen,
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Hungary; Łodz, Poland; and Tegucigalpa, Honduras, public managers and trade unions
successfully collaborated to strengthen the public operator’s performance and reject the
proposed adoption of PSP (Lobina & Hall, 2000). In Grenoble, France and Milan, Italy
local authorities opted for in-house provision in response to problems experienced with
PSP. Also, in both cases national legislation influenced the adoption of the organisational
mode. In Grenoble, remunicipalisation followed a failed and corrupt lease contract. In
Milan, the mayor decided to avoid holding a competitive bidding procedure to select a
private operator. The decision matured after the two major water multinationals came to
dominate the local wastewater market amid controversy (Lobina & Hall, 2007a; Lobina
& Paccagnan, 2005). The beliefs of the political leadership determined the introduction
of participatory practices in Cordoba, Spain and Porto Alegre, Brazil (ERL, UCM, 2005;
Viero & Cordeiro, 2003). The conditionality attached to international and bilateral devel-
opment agencies’ loans and grants have induced in-house restructuring in: Porto Alegre,
Brazil; Kaunas, Lithuania; Riga, Latvia; and, Alexandria, Egypt (Lobina & Hall, 2008a,
2006; ARD, 2005).
In-house restructuring entails different aspects of institutional change. Change in
rules affects incentives by sanctioning different types of behaviour. In turn, rules im-
pact on the norms, values and cultural frames which influence agency. The introduction
of an arms-length relationship between municipal owners and public managers is in-
tended to insulate day-to-day management from political interference (Lobina & Hall,
2006, 2007a; Lobina & Paccagnan, 2005). Public participation in decision making and
regulation aims at strengthening the operator’s accountability and enhancing the respon-
siveness of operations to their intended objectives (Lobina & Hall, 2007a, 2008a; ERL,
UCM, 2005). The reorganisation of corporate structure and reallocation of resources
and tasks can promote operational efficiency and effectiveness (Lobina & Hall, 2006;
Mugisha, 2007). In Tegucigalpa, Honduras, in-house restructuring was based on a two-
pronged strategy. While core managerial responsibilities were decentralised, staff moti-
vation was improved by refocusing organisational values and culture and by involving
workers in designing the reform (Lobina & Hall, 2000). Other cases confirm not only that
the effects of regulative change are reinforced by normative and cultural-cognitive trans-
formation. Such transformation also depends on the bonding outcome of social networks
internal to the operator, as well as on the networks bridging the operator and its social mi-
lieu. In Ahmedabad, India and Azad and Jammu, Pakistan, served communities praised
workers’ commitment and the strengthening of this relationship led to service improve-
ment (Davis, 2004). In Phnom Penh, Cambodia, managerial and financial autonomy, the
redistribution of managerial responsibilities and introduction of performance-related pay
and penalties successfully changed organisational culture. In addition, bill collection and
revenues increased following a campaign to “educate the public, especially high-ranking
families, other government agencies, and even (the operator’s) top management, of the
importance of paying their water bills” (Bryant, 2004; Warwick & Cann, 2007).
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The effects of in-house restructuring are significant. In Tegucigalpa, Honduras,
leakage was reduced and the capacity to supply water increased fivefold in three years.
The continuity and reliability of supply also improved allowing the majority of the pop-
ulation to receive piped water 24 hours a day. In the course of 1995 alone, the population
supplied with treated water by the then wholly Sa˜o Paulo state-owned operator SABESP
increased from 84% to 91%. Sewerage coverage increased from 64% to 73%. In Greno-
ble, France, the remunicipalised operator tripled investment in infrastructure renewal
despite charging lower tariffs than the preceding private operator. Business plans de-
veloped by public management in Debrecen, Hungary and Łodz, Poland successfully
compared against proposals put forward by water multinationals (Lobina & Hall, 2000,
2007a). Under full public ownership and management, Burkina Faso’s utility ONEA
increased service coverage by an annual average of 1.64% from 1990 to 2001. This
compares to 0.83% under a private service contract from 2001 to 2007 (Lobina & Hall,
2009; Fall, 2009) in a context of declining urban growth rates (World Bank, 2002a). In
Phnom Penh, Cambodia, water coverage increased from 20% in 1993 to 70% by 2004
and 90% by 2007 (Bryant, 2004; Warwick & Cann, 2007).
5. Discussion of findings
Rational choice expectations of superior private sector efficiency in water supply
and sanitation are not supported by empirical evidence. These theoretical perspectives
should thus be revised to correct their positive and normative limitations. Rational choice
theories have been criticised for: a) basing their predictions on ex ante incentive align-
ment and ignoring the impact of power on process (Dietrich, 1994; Williamson, 1976);
b) providing an undersocialised account of economic action which neglects the role of
social relations in conditioning behaviour (Granovetter, 1985). Looking at institutional
adaptability from a policy networks perspective, my critique of rational choice theories
aims at integrating these analyses. I thus point to the need for alternative theoretical ac-
counts of water service reform and put forward a research agenda towards that aim. In
fact, public choice and property rights theories do not allow for the efficiency and effec-
tiveness of public operations. Also, Williamson (1999) confines his analysis of public
economic organisations to the public bureau and does not contemplate the possibility of
in-house restructuring.
5.1. Discussion of findings: Problems with PSP in the water sector
Like all private firms, private water operators pursue profit maximisation as their
raison d’eˆtre. Private managers tend to internalise shareholders’ interests, as the latter
have the means to remove the former. Therefore, the behaviour of private managers
is informed by high-powered incentives to achieve profit maximisation. This objective
determines managerial strategies in relation to accessing markets, contract execution,
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and defence of the incumbent’s monopolistic position at contract expiry. Factors taken
into account in the design, implementation and adaptation of interest-seeking strategies
include other actors’ interests, their attitude and ability to take action, and the rules of
the game in a natural monopoly.
Public choice emphasises the self-interestedness of politicians, public managers
and public sector workers, and expects competition to contain the self-interestedness of
private operators. Comparative institutional analysis requires, however, an assessment
of the relative merits of public and private operations. It is difficult to see how the same
corrupt politicians’ conduct would be dishonest when services are publicly managed and
virtuous when PSP is introduced. Indeed, privatisation offers further opportunities for
corruption (Bayliss, 2001; Hellman, Jones, & Kaufmann, 2000). Evidence reviewed for
this article shows that corruption occurs in connection to competitive bidding procedures
and points to the variety of observed private malpractice, extending to collusion and
fraud. Such evidence rebuts expectations that competition in the water sector prevents
corruption, and that the private sector should be expected to behave more honestly than
the public sector.
Rational choice theories expect private sector efficiency to derive from competi-
tion for the market and regulation, greater incentives to obtain profitability and lower
agency costs – the costs for principals to control agents. I find that these expectations
do not hold. The limited competitiveness of the water sector is due to market structure
and private operators’ interest seeking behaviour. Opportunism also allows private op-
erators to appropriate net gains when interacting with contract awarding and regulatory
authorities under different institutional frameworks. While private shareholders enjoy
relatively low agency costs in controlling managers, asymmetric power means that pub-
lic principal-private agent relationships imply high agency costs. If private operators
obtain productive efficiency, power differentials allow them to retain it as rent rather
than passing that on to consumers.
As an economic institution, PSP in the water sector affords flexibility to private
operators’ interest seeking strategies in different institutional contexts. This flexibility is
due to the alignment of private operators’ high-powered incentives with their reliance
on advantageous resource allocation and favourable institutions. To illustrate the flexi-
bility of private operators’ interest seeking strategies under PSP, I identify two scenarios
in light of the incentives informing the behaviour of different actors. In both scenarios,
private operators act under high-powered incentives to appropriate net gains and to take
advantage of resource allocation and institutions. In fact, the decision to introduce PSP
implies the adoption of rules attracting the interest of the private sector by guaranteeing
profitability. In scenarios A and B, contract awarding and regulatory authorities have re-
spectively low-powered and high-powered incentives to ensure that consumers and tax-
payers benefit from private service provision. In scenario A, private operators and public
authorities entertain collaborative relationships, as public actors are not opposed to the
realisation of private objectives. This can be due to a number of factors – public author-
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ities might be corrupt, they might lack the political resolve to tackle poor performance,
they might lack access to information, or have inferior technical and bargaining skills. In
scenario B, private operators and public authorities engage in conflicting relationships
as private operators react to public authorities’ determination to sanction poor perfor-
mance. If private operators’ superior skills are not sufficient to solve the dispute to their
advantage, they can opt for exerting legal or extra-legal pressure on public authorities.
Institutions constraining and regularising agency under PSP are biased in favour
of private operators, which explains the resilience of private sector interests under ad-
verse circumstances. Even in cases where contracts have been demonstrably found to be
vitiated by corruption, private operators’ strategic flexibility has been rewarded through
payment of compensation settlements (Lobina & Hall, 2007a) or with the award of ad-
ditional contracts (Lobina & Paccagnan, 2005). Institutions favourable to private oper-
ators primarily include regulative institutions – contractual arrangements and the appli-
cable national and international law, such as provisions on dispute settlement via in-
ternational arbitration. Regulative institutions’ disposition to safeguard private interests
might be supported by normative and cultural-cognitive institutions such as collective
norms, values and attitudes. Generalised favourable attitudes towards the private sector
have accompanied the diffusion of public choice and New Public Management tenets be-
yond Anglo-Saxon countries (Self, 1993; Hood, 1995). Furthermore, private operators
have demonstrated their ability to obtain the advantageous amendment of rules under
either collaborative or conflicting scenarios. Privatised companies in England and Wales
obtained the extension of the termination notice from a complacent regulator (Hall &
Lobina, 2008). In Arezzo, Italy, the private concessionaire won the standoff against reg-
ulatory authorities by exerting extra-legal pressure and obtained a favourable renego-
tiation of the contract (Lobina, 2005b). Under PSP, the strategic flexibility enjoyed by
private operators is both a determinant of asymmetric power and determined by it. The
favourable alignment of incentives, resources and institutions encourages private water
operators to test the limits of Williamson’s (1976) prediction that only in extreme cir-
cumstances will private operations be terminated. Even when this eventuality occurs,
compensation claims for damages and lost profits represent a last resort for seeking cor-
porate interests.
PSP is thus prone to what Williamson (1999) defines as maladaptation hazards.
These hazards result from the fact that institutional adaptability facilitates the attainment
of private agents’ objectives in conflict with the intended objectives of public princi-
pals. Under PSP, institutional adaptability provides the conditions for the deployment of
asymmetric power to achieve outcomes unaligned to reform objectives. The maladapta-
tion hazards of PSP are epitomised by the fact that priority accorded to private opera-
tors’ commercial considerations hinders the integrated and sustainable reproduction of
interdependent PESTE cycles. In turn, the institutional adaptability of PSP is not only
adverse to sustainability but also lowly remediable. Due to the combination of asymmet-
ric power and institutions favouring private interests, public principals face high costs to
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steer private agents away from an undesired course of action. Under PSP, institutional
alignment causes what I define as “Willig’s paradox”: it is the institutional framework
expected to promote efficiency by shielding private operators from non-commercial de-
mands (Willig, 1994) that allows private operators to abuse of their monopoly power.
5.2. Discussion of findings: In-house restructuring in the water sector
The reviewed evidence shows that public efficiency and efficacy is possible, as is
successful in-house restructuring. Furthermore, it illustrates how the public sector en-
compasses a variety of organisational forms having in common full public ownership
and control. The public sector cannot thus be construed as representing an organisa-
tional monolith (Hall, 2007). It also points to the diversity of in-house restructuring
strategies successfully adopted in different social and economic contexts. What emerges
is the ability of restructured public operators to pursue a variety of PESTE sustainability
objectives, for example both sound financial management and the extension of service
coverage, without privileging one at the expense of the other.
In the absence of conclusive evidence on the relative efficiency of administrative
departments compared to reformed public operators, I conjecture that efficiency can be
obtained under administrative departments and not only as a result of in-house restruc-
turing. As no organisational mode is plausible of perfection (Williamson, 1999), I admit
the possibility of both efficiency and inefficiency of public operations, whether managed
by administrative departments or reformed public enterprises. Starting my analysis with
administrative departments, I assume that there are no external impediments to efficiency
and ask whether public bureaus have the resources and incentives to run efficient and ef-
fective operations. These two questions permit the identification of four possible cases:
a) the public bureau has both adequate resources and adequate incentives; b) the public
bureau lacks adequate resources but has adequate incentives; c) the public bureau has
adequate resources but lacks adequate incentives; and, d) the public bureau lacks both
adequate resources and adequate incentives. Unlike the other three, scenario a) is likely
to lead to efficiency without the need of external intervention. The occurrence of this
scenario requires an explanation.
Public choice adopts a simplistic assumption by expecting the self-interestedness
and corruption of public managers and employees to prevail over behavioural alterna-
tives. A more realistic hypothesis is that whether individual conduct is informed by self-
interestedness, honesty, or morality, depends on the concrete personal relations and net-
works of relations in which public managers and employees participate. These relations
and networks thereof can in fact generate trust and discourage malfeasance (Granovet-
ter, 1985). Probity in the public bureau is the result of the low-powered incentives of
civil servants to appropriate net gains, the administrative control to which bureaucratic
routines are subject and the contract law regime which provides for flat remuneration
and security of employment (Williamson, 1999). In addition to the effect of regulative
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institutions such as administrative rules and contracts, individual behaviour is shaped
by the obligations inherent in the networks of personal relations (Granovetter, 1985), or
derived from normative and cognitive institutions. The adequacy of resources can be ex-
plained in light of the administrative department’s reliance on central or local taxation,
the sufficient scale of the administration to attract financial and human resources through
charging, and the accumulation of organisational memory throughout time. Scenario a)
approximates the Weberian ideal type of bureaucracy structured around clear hierarchi-
cal authority, administrative due process, deep professional knowledge of the process,
and public sector ethos (Williamson, 1999). This scenario implies the benevolence of
government, as owner, regulator and financier of the administrative department.
Scenario b) differs from scenario a) in terms of the availability of resources, which
can be scarce in a weak macroeconomic and institutional context. Nonetheless, the limi-
tation of resources can be remedied thanks to collaboration with external public agencies.
Capacity building can thus be achieved by public operators entering into Public-Public
Partnerships (PUPs), defined as peer relationships between public entities, forged around
common values and operational objectives, and which exclude profit-seeking (Lobina &
Hall, 2006). Alternatively, financial and human resources for supporting viable public
service provision can be obtained through intergovernmental cooperation, including the
sharing of services among more municipalities (Warner, 2006; Warner & Hefetz, 2003;
Hukka & Vinnari, 2007).
Scenarios c) and d) are characterised by the lack of adequate incentives to operate
efficiently and effectively, which requires a distinction between the incentives affecting
the behaviour of public owners and that of public managers and workers. Individual
politicians may lack the incentive to diligently direct and control a public undertaking
due to corruption, patronage or the political costs associated with institutional change.
The professionalism of public managers and workers might suffer in the absence of au-
thoritative guidance and effective regulative and normative sanctions oriented towards
virtuous conduct. However, wrongdoing in the public sector is not inevitable and institu-
tional change can align the incentives of politicians, public managers and workers with
public service objectives. Public participation and greater transparency can strengthen
the incentives of politicians and management by making them more accountable to,
respectively, voters and politicians. In-house restructuring can introduce clear respon-
sibilities by providing for politicians to define strategic policy and public managers to
take charge of day-to-day operations. Workforce discipline and morale can be reinforced
with decent pay, training and involvement in the workplace. Greater efficiency can be
stimulated by rewarding success. In addition, social dialogue can persuade politicians
of the political advantages of developing water services; reconfiguring social networks
of interaction between workers and the served communities can build trust and instigate
morality (Davis, 2004).
Under public operations, the prevalence of high- over low-powered incentives is
due to a pathological state in which individual agents are disenfranchised from their po-
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litical and organisational principals. Far from being inevitable, this condition can be re-
versed by institutional change as a result of pressures external and internal to the polity.
This can lead to the reestablishment of hierarchy in principal-agent relationships both
within the operator and between the operator and its principals. Success in modifying
the attitude of self-interested individuals and redirecting resource mobilisation, relies
on the fact that institutions supporting public operations are designed to facilitate the
achievement of collective goals. This makes the alignment of individual attitudes, re-
sources and institutions less resilient to sustainability-oriented change under in-house
service provision than PSP – whose ultimate goal, appropriation, is divergent from the
intended reform objectives. Remediable institutional alignment undergirds the compar-
ative advantage of public water operations, as more ample opportunities are provided
for compliance, efficiency and adaptive performance through the alternative organisa-
tional modes offered under public ownership. Remediable institutional alignment does
not only explain scrupulous task execution, but also how cost savings are passed on to the
served communities. In the absence of commercial imperatives, the hierarchy of public
enterprise supersedes high-powered incentives and directs individual efforts towards the
transfer of added value. This value is not exclusively of economic nature as it extends
through the multiplicity of PESTE sustainability dimensions. Public operators’ emphasis
on different aspects of sustainability is a function of local decision making, susceptible
of changes as the local context evolves. Multiple agency and low-powered incentives
are not the cause of public inefficiency, as claimed by rational choice theorists, but the
determinants of public superiority in promoting sustainable water service development.
I call this Lorrain’s (1997a) paradox.
6. Concluding remarks: A research agenda for public water service reform
Public choice and property rights theory are inadequate to guide scholarly inquiry
and inform the action of policy participants in the water sector. These rational choice
theories adopt narrow behavioural assumptions limited to individual self-interestedness.
Their decontextualised understanding of the interrelationship between agency and insti-
tutions ignores the impact of power and process on outcome. In contrast, a combined
policy networks and transaction cost economics approach offers the basis for a com-
prehensive analysis of the dynamics of water service reform. This approach allows for
investigating a broader range of behavioural assumptions beyond bounded rationality,
the role of power beyond static resource allocation, the role of institutions beyond rules,
and the mutual dependence of individual and organisational incentives, resources and
institutions.
In the past 30 years, conventional wisdom has led the academic and mainstream
international water community to extol the virtues of the private sector and denigrate
public water service provision. This has resulted in scant empirical attention to the mer-
its of public enterprise, and insufficient theorisation of public ownership and operating
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performance in the water sector. This article finds that public operations are a more ver-
satile vehicle to enhance water service sustainability than PSP. However, we need a better
understanding of the merits of different organisational forms admissible under outright
public ownership and management. I have compiled a list of related research questions
in Lobina (2012), which could be part of a research agenda for public enterprise perfor-
mance in the urban water sector. In light of the limitations of public choice and property
rights theory, this agenda should aim at the formulation of a critical realist account (Lee,
2011) of reform outcome, free from rational choice dogma. I suggest that the following
are the main themes of this agenda.
The first theme concerns an analysis of sustainable water development as a social
welfare function, intended to reflect the complexity of the objectives of urban water ser-
vices and to inform their governance. This analysis will address normative coherence as a
causal mechanism of sustainable development and governance. The second theme is the
formulation of a behavioural assumption that transcends individual self-interestedness
and articulates hierarchy with the autonomy of agents. The third theme consists in the
identification of the attributes of public organisational modes enabling sustainable water
operations. These attributes will be assessed in view of their propensity to induce remedi-
able institutional alignment, output maximisation and social responsiveness. The fourth
theme is an explanation of the interdependencies between the institutional attributes of
organisational modes and the institutional matrix of the relevant governance subsystem.
The development of these themes promises to result in an account concerned with so-
cial and environmental justice, contingency, and non-linear causality, while avoiding the
undersocialised narrative of rational choice. The sketched research agenda is a critical
realist project open to contributions from academicians and policy participants in the
water sector - policy and decision makers, operators, workers, civil society, voters and
practitioners. Beyond the lexical divide separating communities of practice, practical
knowledge has as much to contribute to advancing our understanding of the reality we
live in as it has social scientific knowledge (Sayer, 1992).
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